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WYETH V. LEVINE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN AND WHERE DO
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES GO FROM HERE
Clay Landa*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent landmark decision in Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court
put drug manufacturers on notice that they can and should be liable for state
tort claims for the harm their products cause regardless of Federal Drug
Administration (―FDA‖) approval of the drug‘s use and warning labels.1
The decision dispels recent efforts by pharmaceutical companies to claim
that they have no greater duty to warn consumers of risks from their
products above and beyond the FDA‘s approved warnings.2 Therefore,
drug makers, under current statutes and regulations, continue to bear the
responsibility for maintaining the safety of their products and for keeping
their warning labels up to date or face paying the price for state tort claims. 3
Drug makers may not claim that FDA approval of their drugs and warning
labels, under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (―FDCA‖),
preempts state tort claims for failure to warn of risks that caused harm.4
Absent a blanket federal preemption claim, drug makers find themselves
back in a traditional products liability tort system. In this setting, drug
makers must continue to follow the mandates of the FDCA and
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1. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202, 1204 (2009).
2. See id. at 1199; Jonathan V. O‘Steen & Van O‘Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx and the Argument
Against Federal Preemption of State Claims for Injuries Resulting from Defective Drugs, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 67, 70 (2006) (noting that a finding of preemption would allow drug companies to skirt the
common law duty to monitor their own products safety after approval).
3. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1197–98; Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSWiki,
http://www.scotuswiki.com/index.php?title=Wyeth_v._Levine (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
4. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1204.
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corresponding regulations for drug approval and warning labels.5 However,
since federal preemption will not apply, even if the FDA approves a
warning for a specific hazard, the drug maker may be found liable in state
courts for harm caused by that hazard.6 A warning, therefore, even though
approved by the FDA, may not be enough if the state courts determine the
warning was not strong enough.7
Without being able to point to one nationwide standard for warning
labels and without specific state standards, drug makers would appear to be
at the mercy of individual state court juries or judges to determine what
warning was appropriate even though the FDA approved a specific warning
label. The court system, however, only informs drug makers after the fact
that the warning was not strong enough and does not provide clear, specific
standards for compliance like FDA regulations.8 Wyeth argued this exact
point before the Supreme Court and urged that allowing state tort claims
when the FDA approved a specific label would thwart the regulatory system
set up by Congress in the FDCA.9
Still, there are numerous avenues available for pharmaceutical
companies to limit their liability and continue to produce and market drugs
profitably. The Supreme Court‘s decision does not implicate or amend the
required FDA approval of warning labels.10 Therefore, one approach for a
drug maker, knowing of a potential hazard, would be to unilaterally
strengthen their warning without prior FDA approval under current
regulations to head off any state tort claims for failure to warn.11 If the
FDA ultimately determines not to approve the strengthened label, under
explicit authority granted by Congress in the FDCA, drug makers have a
strong argument that implicit conflict preemption now applies.12 As
another avenue, drug makers may include a potential warning amounting to
a prohibition of the drug‘s use or method of delivery when seeking initial
approval of the warning label.13 Again, if the FDA explicitly rejects such a
5. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006).
6. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202.
7. Id. at 1201–02.
8. See W. Wylie Blair, Implied Preemption of State Tort Law Claims Against Prescription Drug
Manufacturers Based Upon FDA Approval, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 289, 300 (2006) (arguing that state tort
law actions are not a determination of a drug‘s risks and benefits founded on a centralized expert
evaluation).
9. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199.
10. Id. at 1198.
11. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (2009).
12. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198 (stating that the Court will not hold it is impossible for drug
manufacturer to comply with state tort claim and FDA labeling requirements absent clear evidence FDA
would not have approved strengthened warning).
13. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)–(d) (2006) (mandating new drug application, FDA determination that drug
is safe and effective as shown in the proposed labeling, and the format and contents of drug labels
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prohibitive warning, a drug maker may likely claim the FDA rejection
preempts any state court requirement for the warning. 14 In addition, drug
makers may seek legislative action, both at the federal and state levels.15 In
Congress, pharmaceutical companies could push for addition of an explicit
preemption clause similar to one currently in the FDCA for medical
devices.16 Finally, drug makers could take their case to state legislatures,
seeking statutes that would not allow state tort claims for a failure to warn
when the manufacturer complied with FDA regulations.17
Part II of this paper analyzes the history and background of federal
preemption to give context to the current environment after Wyeth. Part III
analyzes the Supreme Court‘s decision in Wyeth, holding that the FDCA
and corresponding regulations do not preempt state tort claims.18 Finally,
Part IV discusses and analyzes what drug makers may do now to continue
to produce and market pharmaceuticals profitably while limiting their
liability for state tort claims.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF PREEMPTION
A. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. and the Intent and Purpose of Congress
In Cipollone, the Supreme Court laid down its touchstone analysis that
the intent and purpose of Congress is the key to determine if federal
preemption obviates a state failure to warn tort claim.19 In this case, the
Court considered whether two federal cigarette labeling acts in 1965 and
1969 providing express preemption provisions sufficed to preempt state
failure to warn claims.20 The 1965 Act contained a vague preemption
provision, providing that no other statement other than that required by the
Act was required on any cigarette package.21 In 1969, Congress amended
the labeling preemption provision to provide that no state could impose any
requirement or prohibition concerning the advertising or promotion of any
cigarette packages labeled in conformity with the Act.22

including the risk information the label must contain).
14. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198.
15. See infra Part IV.C.
16. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
17. See infra notes 152–55 and accompanying text.
18. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1204.
19. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516–20 (1992).
20. Id. at 514–15.
21. Id. at 514 (quoting Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5, 79 Stat.
282, 283 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 (2006))).
22. Id. at 515 (quoting Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 5, 84 Stat.
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As the two Acts contained express preemption provisions, the Court
needed only to engage in standard statutory construction to determine the
extent of the federal preemption and whether it was Congress‘ intent to
preempt tort claims for failure to warn.23 The Court found the 1969
amendments prohibiting any differing state requirements did preempt state
tort claims, as the failure to warn would impose an additional duty or a
requirement on a cigarette manufacturer.24 As the 1965 Act did not prohibit
any such requirements, this version of the Act did not preempt a state
common law claim.25 While Cipollone provided an exercise in statutory
construction of an express provision, it also laid the cornerstone for implied
conflict preemption through Justice Blackmun‘s concurrence.26 Justice
Blackmun agreed with the majority that the intent and purpose of Congress
was the touchstone of any preemption analysis, but added that absent an
express provision, the Court must resort to the principles of implied
preemption to determine whether state law actually conflicts with federal
law.27 In essence, the Court must attempt to determine the intent of
Congress to supplant a state law when Congress is silent.28
B. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. and Frustration of Purpose
In Geier, the plaintiff brought a claim against Honda, alleging that the
manufacturer negligently designed the vehicle by not equipping it with a
driver‘s side airbag.29 Honda argued the Department of Transportation‘s
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, which allowed car
manufacturers to select from a range of safety features, preempted a state
negligence claim as Honda complied with the minimum safety standard.30
The question appeared to center on whether states could impose tort
liability upon a car manufacturer who failed to exceed the federal
standard.31

87, 88 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006))).
23. See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2100 (2000) (noting that
when Congress includes an express preemption clause, the work of the Court is limited and
straightforward: ―to interpret the express preemption clause and determine whether the state law at issue
falls within the preemptive scope‖).
24. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522.
25. Id. at 519–20.
26. Id. at 532 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Geier v Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000).
30. Id. at 881.
31. O‘Steen & O‘Steen, supra note 2, at 73–74.
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The Court, however, as indicated by Justice Blackmun‘s concurrence in
Cipollone, did not just ask whether the federal standard created a ceiling or
a floor for safety regulations, but considered the purpose and intent of the
Department of Transportation in creating the regulation.32 First, the Court
interpreted the express preemption provision contained in the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,33 providing that no state could
establish a safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a
motor vehicle or equipment which is not identical to the federal standard.34
Next, the Court considered the effect of the express preemption provision in
light of a savings clause that compliance with a federal safety standard does
not exempt any person from liability under common law.35 The Court held
that a reading of the preemption clause and savings clause together showed
that Congress did not intend the Act or implementing regulations to
preempt common law tort claims.36
The Court‘s analysis did not end there, however. While Congress‘ intent
may not have been to preempt tort actions, the Court considered the statute,
specifically the safety standard approved by the Department of
Transportation, under the doctrine of implied conflict preemption to
consider whether a state tort action would frustrate the objectives of the
Department even though Congress expressly stated preemption did not
apply.37 The Court determined that while the express provision did not
preempt state law claims, the Department of Transportation intended to
gradually introduce safety improvements over time.38 Therefore, holding
manufacturers liable for not exceeding the federal safety requirements
under state tort law would frustrate this objective of gradual introduction,
and thus, the federal safety standard preempted state tort claims.39
C. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine: Setting the Floor, Not the Ceiling for
Actions
In Sprietsma, the plaintiff brought a common law tort claim against a
boat manufacturer, alleging the propeller that injured her after falling
overboard should have been equipped with a propeller guard.40 As in
Geier, the Court first interpreted an express preemption clause, stating that
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Geier, 529 U.S. at 881.
49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30170 (2006).
Geier, 529 U.S. at 867 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) (repealed 1994)).
Id. at 868.
Id.
Id. at 870–86.
Id. at 874–75.
Id. at 875.
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 55 (2002).
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no state may enact a boat safety standard that is not identical with the
federal regulations, and a savings clause, stating that compliance with
federal regulations does not relieve a person from common or state law
liability.41 Again, as in Geier, the Court rejected that the federal standard
preempted all state tort claims and looked to whether implied conflict
preemption obviated state claims.42 While the Geier Court found implied
preemption applied, the Coast Guard‘s lack of enacting a safety regulation
to require propeller guards in Sprietsma after a lengthy study did not
preempt state tort actions.43 The Coast Guard‘s failure to act indicated that
the Coast Guard had not made a policy decision that propeller guards were
unnecessary and that states should or could not impose more stringent
safety measures.44
D. Medical Device and Drug Cases: Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr and Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc.
In Lohr, the Court considered whether federal laws and regulations
preempted a state claim for a failed pacemaker and a failure to warn of the
potential problem.45 As in previously discussed cases, the medical device
portion of the federal act contained an express preemption provision,
prohibiting states from enacting any medical device requirements different
from or in addition to federal standards.46 While such a provision appeared
to preempt state claims, the devil was once again in the details. Here, the
FDA approved the device under a grandfather clause, allowing the device as
substantially equivalent to a device in existence before passage of the
amendments in 1976 and therefore subjecting it to a much less rigorous
examination process.47 The Court determined that the less stringent
examination process did not impose specific design requirements and
without such requirements, the federal standards could not preempt state
regulation.48 Similarly, FDA regulations concerning labels and warnings
did not preempt state failure to warn claims because they were too general
to be applicable to the specific device in question.49 Finally, the Court
affirmed that in all preemption cases, there is a presumption against
preemption absent a clear congressional intent to supersede state law,

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 58–59 (quoting 46 U.S.C. §§ 4306, 4311 (2006)).
Id. at 65.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 66–67.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 481 (1996).
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478–80.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 501.
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including state common law.50
In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Supreme Court again considered claims
of negligence, labeling, and implied warranty against a manufacturer under
the very same statutes as Lohr.51 Contrary to Lohr, the catheter in question
here underwent a more rigorous pre-market approval process by the FDA.52
Therefore, the Court considered whether the pre-market approval process
and FDA approval imposed federal requirements and then whether a state
tort claim differed from those requirements.53 If state common law claims
imposed any differing requirement, federal standards must preempt state
claims according to the express preemption provision in the Medical Device
Amendments.54 The rigorous pre-market approval process, which is
specific to each device tested and approved by the FDA, imposed the type
of requirements that were missing under the substantial equivalence test in
Lohr.55 Since the common law claim in question sought to require the
catheter to be safer than the model approved by the FDA, a state tort action
imposed a differing and heightened requirement.56 The federal law thus
preempted such a differing requirement.57
Riegel was important not only for this statutory interpretation of the
express preemption clause, but also for its discussion of the level of agency
deference the Court should afford to the FDA‘s interpretation of the
FDCA.58 The Court specifically noted they did not have to rely on the
FDA‘s position that preemption applies because the statute speaks for itself,
but did agree with the dissent that only minimal deference under Skidmore
v. Swift & Co. would apply.59 Under Skidmore, the weight given to the
agency‘s interpretation ―‗depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control.‘‖60 This consideration of agency deference
provides keen insight into the Court‘s decision in Wyeth v. Levine, where
there is no express preemption provision to guide the Court‘s

50. Id. at 485.
51. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320–21 (2008).
52. Id. at 317–20.
53. Id. at 321–22.
54. Id. at 316 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006)).
55. Id. at 322–23.
56. Id. at 324–25.
57. Id. at 330.
58. Id. at 326–27.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 338 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)).
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determination.61
III. WYETH V. LEVINE
A. Regulatory Scheme
A manufacturer, such as Wyeth, must submit a New Drug Application to
the FDA for approval of all new pharmaceutical drugs, in this case
Phenergan.62 The FDA must approve the drug unless the manufacturer fails
to demonstrate that the drug is safe and effective, the drug will perform as
represented, and the label is not false or misleading. 63 The FDA then
mandates through regulations the format and content of drug labels, as well
as the risk information the label must contain.64 Once approved, normally
any changes to the label and warnings must receive FDA approval before
the manufacturer issues the altered label.65 However, the FDA regulations
also allow a manufacturer to distribute a drug with an altered label after
submitting the change to the FDA, but prior to any FDA approval, if the
changes ―‗add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution or
adverse reaction‘ or... ‗add or strengthen an instruction about dosage and
administration that is intended to increase the safe use of the drug
product.‘‖66 Therefore, section 314.70(c) allows a drug manufacturer to
strengthen the warnings given on a label without any FDA approval or
regulation.67
B. Phenergan‘s Uses and Levine‘s Circumstances
Under this regulatory scheme, the FDA approved a warning label
submitted by Wyeth that provided when injecting the drug intravenously,
heath care workers should exercise extreme care to avoid intra-arterial
injection.68 Such intra-arterial injection could lead to pain, severe chemical
irritation, severe spasms, and gangrene requiring amputation.69 In addition,
the warning indicated, ―it is usually preferable to inject it through the tubing
of an intravenous infusion set that is known to be functioning

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1190 (2009).
Id. at 1194–95 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
Id. at 1195; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006).
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1196 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(b) (2009)).
Id.
Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C) (2009)).
Id.
Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1191 n.1.
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satisfactorily.‖ 70 Therefore, the Phenergan label did not prohibit the use of
direct intravenous injection or IV-push administration or indicate such a
method should not be used.71
In April 2000, the plaintiff visited a local clinic complaining of nausea
resulting from a migraine headache.72 Medical staff first administered the
drug by intramuscular injection, which caused no harmful side effects.73
The same day, when the nausea continued, medical staff directly injected
Phenergan by the IV-push method rather than through tubing or
intramuscular injection.74 The medical staff inadvertently injected the drug
into an artery resulting in severe damage, gangrene, and ultimately the
amputation of Levine‘s hand and forearm.75
Levine brought a claim against Wyeth in Vermont Superior Court for
negligence and failure to warn, arguing that the label should have prohibited
IV push, as it was safer to use other available options.76 Wyeth countered
with three arguments: (1) the FDA‘s approval of the drug label impliedly
preempted state common law claims that the label was inadequate; (2) the
FDA was aware of the dangers of IV push but did not prohibit its use so
Wyeth could not prohibit its use; and (3) state common law claims
penalizing drug companies for using FDA approved labels would pose an
obstacle to the purpose of the FDA‘s labeling regulations.77
C. Holding and Analysis
1. Purpose and Intent of Congress and Presumption Against Preemption
Prior to analyzing Wyeth‘s arguments that it would be impossible to
comply with federal and state law and that state tort claims would obstruct
the objectives and purposes of Congress, the Court set down two judicial
cornerstones of preemption to guide the Court‘s decision.78 ―First, ‗the
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption
case.‘‖79 Second, in a preemption case where Congress has legislated in a
field traditionally left to the states, the Court applies a presumption against

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. at 1191–92 n.1.
Id. at 1191.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1191–92.
Id. at 1192–93.
Id. at 1194.
Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
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preemption because the ―‗historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.‘‖80
The history of the FDCA and the regulatory scheme dictated above
indicate that Congress required the manufacturer to prove and maintain the
safety and effectiveness of their drugs.81 Further, Congress took great care
to ensure the continuation of state law in the face of federal legislation by
inserting a savings clause in 1962, which detailed that a federal law would
only preempt state law upon a direct and positive conflict with the FDCA.82
Notably, Congress enacted an express preemption provision for medical
devices in 1976 but chose not to include a similar provision for prescription
drugs.83 Finally, after Levine‘s lawsuit against Wyeth commenced,
Congress again amended the FDCA to grant the FDA authority to require a
drug maker to change a warning label based on information that becomes
available after a drug‘s initial approval; however, Congress specifically
rejected a proposed provision to require FDA preapproval of any change to
a label.84
2. Complying with Both State and Federal Law is Not Impossible
Wyeth first contended that the FDA mandates the Company use the
specific and identical label approved for the drug.85 Further, Wyeth argued
an amendment to the regulation, allowing a change to the warning label
without FDA approval, simply reaffirmed the accepted interpretation of the
regulation that a manufacturer may only strengthen a warning ―to reflect
newly acquired information.‖86 Therefore, Wyeth argued, this section
mandates a strengthened warning only if new information has emerged that
the FDA did not have when initially approving the warning label.87
Without any such information presented in this case, Wyeth argued it was
impossible for them to strengthen Phenergan‘s label to comply with the
state duty imposed by Vermont and comply with the FDA mandate.88 If
Wyeth had chosen to unilaterally strengthen their warning without any
80. Id. at 1194–95 (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485).
81. Id. at 1195.
82. Id. at 1196.
83. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006)).
84. Id. (citing Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, § 901, Publ. L. No. 110-85,
121 Stat. 823, 922 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 555 (Supp. I 2009)); Prescription Drug User Fee
Amendments of 2007, S. 1082, 110th Cong. § 208 (2007) (as passed by Senate, Apr. 10, 2007)
(proposing new section 506D)).
85. Id. at 1196 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(b) (2009)).
86. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (2009)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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newly acquired information that the FDA did not consider when approving
the label, so the argument goes, they would violate federal law.89
The Supreme Court determined that either under the new clarification in
the regulation or as it stood at the time of Levine‘s injury, Wyeth could
have complied with federal requirements and strengthened the warning to
comply with Vermont‘s requirements.90 Specifically, even under the new
interpretation requiring ―newly acquired information,‖ Wyeth could have
strengthened their warning based on a new analysis of existing data that
Wyeth already submitted to the FDA.91 While Wyeth knew of the risks of
Phenergan administrated by IV push, a new analysis of this risk could have
shown an adverse reaction of a different type, greater severity, or higher
frequency that would constitute newly acquired information under the
regulation.92 The record indicated at least twenty cases of gangrene and
subsequent amputations from Phenergan injections, and therefore, Wyeth
had ample opportunity to review this data to determine a greater risk and
strengthen the warning as specifically allowed without FDA approval.93
Further, strengthening the warning prior to FDA approval would not
result in an unauthorized distribution of a drug or misbranding.94
Unauthorized distribution only occurs when a manufacturer puts out a new
drug.95 Strengthening a label on an existing drug, under specific regulations
that grant drug makers the authority to strengthen the label prior to FDA
approval, does not make Phenergan a new drug.96 In addition, misbranding
does not occur simply because a manufacturer altered a label as allowed
under regulations or else the regulation would have no meaning.97

While the Supreme Court could have stopped there and held it was not
impossible for Wyeth to comply with both state and federal law, the Court
further stated that under the FDCA, drug manufacturers, and not the FDA,
bear the primary responsibility for the safety of their products.98 When the
risk of gangrene and amputation became apparent to Wyeth, they had a duty
to provide a warning that adequately detailed the risk, and federal
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1196–97.
91. Id. at 1197.
92. Id. (citing Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics,
and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,607 (Aug. 22, 2008)).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2006) (defining ―new drug‖); 21 C.F.R. § 310.3(h) (2009)).
97. See id.
98. Id. at 1197–98.
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regulations specifically provided an avenue to provide this warning prior to
FDA approval.99 The Supreme Court further stated that they would not
hold it was impossible to comply with both federal and state requirements
without clear evidence that the FDA would have rejected the strengthened
warning required by state law.100 For Phenergan, the FDA did review
evidence of the risks of IV push and approve a label that did specifically
warn against the risks of improper administration.101 In this case, however,
there was no evidence the FDA ―gave more than passing attention to the
issue,‖ the FDA made an affirmative decision to retain IV push, the FDA
would have prohibited a strengthened warning, or that Wyeth submitted an
extensive evaluation or analysis about the specific dangers from IV push.102
The Vermont courts required a strengthened warning, the FDA regulations
allowed Wyeth to strengthen Phenergan‘s warning, and Wyeth failed to
present any evidence that the FDA would have prevented that warning.103
3. State Tort Claims Do Not Obstruct the Purposes and Objectives of
Congress to Regulate Drug Labels
Alternatively, Wyeth argued that FDA regulations are both the ceiling
and floor for pharmaceutical warning labels such that FDA approval
preempts any state tort claim concerning the drug‘s warning, regardless of
whether the FDA considered the risk at issue.104 Further, Wyeth argued that
since the FDA determines that a drug is safe and its warning adequate, the
Court must presume that the FDA performed a ―precise balancing of risks
and benefits and... established a specific labeling standard that leaves no
room for different state-law judgments.‖105

The Court strenuously dismissed these arguments. First, the entire
history of Congressional action in passing and amending the FDCA
indicates Congressional intent to continue to allow state tort claims in the
face of federal legislation.106 Further, throughout the seventy-year history
of the FDCA, Congress never chose to include an express preemption
provision for pharmaceutical drugs, while they did choose to do so for
99. Id. at 1198.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 1198 & n.5.
102. Id. at 1199.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1200.
106. Id. at 1199; see also id. at 1199–1200 n.7 (stating that Congress did not provide a federal remedy
for consumers in the 1938 statute specifically because witnesses testified that no such action was
necessary since common law claims were already available under state law).
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medical devices, over the counter medications, and cosmetics.107 Where
Congress is aware of state law that may potentially conflict with a federal
interest and it chooses not to act, ―‗the case for federal preemption is
particularly weak‘‖, especially in light of the presumption against
preemption.108
In spite of Congress‘ apparent intent to remain silent, Wyeth argued the
Court should rely on a recently enacted preamble to a 2006 FDA regulation,
stating that the FDCA does act as a ceiling and a floor so that any approved
FDA label preempts state tort claims.109 The FDA preamble further stated
that state tort claims threatened the FDA‘s role to act as the expert
evaluating and regulating drugs.110
While the Court has recognized that agency regulations carrying the
force of law can preempt a state claim, the Court has only found so after
conducting its own conflict determination by interpreting the state and
federal law and has not relied solely on the agency‘s determination of
preemption.111 Where Congress has not expressly delegated preemption
authority to an agency, the Court may give some weight to an agency
assertion of preemption.112 However, the Court does not solely defer to the
agency‘s conclusion that preemption is appropriate, but instead gives some
weight to the agency‘s explanation of how the state claims will affect the
federal regulatory scheme.113
In this case, the Court concluded the FDA‘s preamble merited no
deference.114 Specifically, the FDA enacted the preamble in 2006 without
compliance with administrative law requirements for notice and comment
and after the initial proposed rule explained there would be no preemption

107. Id. at 1200 (―Congress could have applied [the medical device] pre-emption clause to the entire
FDCA. It did not do so, but instead wrote a pre-emption clause that applies only to medical devices.‖
(citing Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326 (2008))); id. at 1200 n.8 (Congress preempted
certain state requirements for over the counter medications and cosmetics, but stated ―‗[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to modify or otherwise affect any action or the liability of any person under
the product liability law of any State.‘‖ (quoting 21 U.S.C. §§ 379r(e), 379s(d) (2006))).
108. Id. at 1200 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989)).
109. Id. (citing Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Perscription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3,922, 3,934–35 (Jan. 24, 2006)).
110. Id. (citing Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Perscription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3,935).
111. Id. at 1201.
112. Id.
113. Id. (―[W]e have given ‗some weight‘ to an agency‘s views about the impact of tort law on federal
objectives when ‗the subject matter is technical[l] and the relevant history and background are complex
and extensive.‘ Even in such cases, however, we have not deferred to an agency‘s conclusion that state
law is preempted.‖ (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000))).
114. Id.
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or federalism effects.115 Again, while the Court could have stopped here,
they chose to go further and state that the preamble was completely at odds
with the long history of the FDA and with evidence of Congress‘
purpose.116
Further, the Court determined federal drug labeling requirements were
not analogous to the regulatory scheme presented in Geier.117 In Geier, the
Court found preemption based on its own analysis of the issues, finding that
a state law claim requiring a specific vehicle safety device would pose an
obstacle to the properly adopted federal scheme of phasing in safety
devices.118 After undergoing this independent analysis, the Geier Court
considered the agency‘s preemption conclusion only as further support for
their holding.119 In Wyeth, the Court did not consider a regulation carrying
the force of law, and even if it had, the long history of the FDCA and the
FDA‘s position on state tort claims indicates that state tort claims do not
pose an obstacle to federal drug labeling regulations.120
IV. GOING FORWARD: PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES‘ REACTIONS
In the wake of this landmark decision, the pharmaceutical companies‘
worst fears seemed realized; instead of one regulatory compliance scheme,
they would be subject to the whim of fifty states‘ court systems.121 An
initial reading of the Wyeth decision would appear to put drug makers in a
potentially hazardous position. They still need to comply with the FDCA
and corresponding federal regulations to submit data about benefits and
risks of a drug along with proposed warning labels.122 However, drug
companies still have a duty to provide an adequate warning as judged by
each individual state‘s judicial system, and the drug companies have no
standards or guidelines to follow to determine what each individual state
considers adequate warning.123

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1203.
118. Geier, 529 U.S. at 874–75.
119. Id. at 875–77.
120. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1203–04.
121. Steve Forbes, Supremely Destructive Stupidity, FORBES, Apr. 13, 2009, at 13 (remarking that the
Supreme Court‘s finding allowing state tort liability for federally approved drugs will lead to situations
where drug makers must prepare for warning labels as judged by fifty states rather than one federally
delegated authority).
122. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)–(d) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (2009).
123. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Information Age: The Supreme Court and the Tyranny of Lawyers, WALL.
ST. J., Mar. 9, 2009, at A17 (stating that every drug must carry fifty different warnings, one for each
state, and even then, these warnings may be updated from time to time by local juries).
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While many in the business community are lambasting this precarious
position imposed on drug makers and potentially other businesses,124 there
are numerous options available for pharmaceutical companies to limit their
liability, comply with both state and federal laws, and continue to market
their products profitably.
A. Strengthened Warnings Without Prior Approval
As the Supreme Court noted, current FDA regulations allow a
pharmaceutical company to unilaterally strengthen prescription medication
warnings based upon newly acquired information without receiving prior
FDA approval.125 The ―newly acquired information‖ does not have to be
actual data of a risk that has surfaced since the approval of the drug. 126
Instead, a drug company may analyze existing data or information of
greater risks or frequency of injuries and side effects to determine that the
drug is causing harm.127 In light of the Supreme Court‘s strong language
that drug companies carry the primary responsibility for post-approval
monitoring of their drugs‘ safety,128 drug companies should consider
themselves on notice to monitor this activity anyway.
Drug companies may choose to strengthen their warnings, even to the
point of equaling a prohibition on the drug‘s use or a specific method of
delivery, and then submit this change to the FDA as required for
approval.129 As the FDA retains ultimate authority to review this change
and either approve or reject the new labels use, the drug companies would
have concrete evidence if sued in state torts to argue for preemption.130 If
the FDA denied the use of the strengthened warning and then an injured
party sues the company in state court for failure to adequately warn, the
drug company can rely on this denial as evidence that they could not
provide a stronger warning under federal law.131 In such a case, the
124. See id.; Forbes supra note 121.
125. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1196–97.
126. Id. at 1197 (citing Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drug,
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49, 603, 49, 604 (Aug. 22, 2008)).
127. Id. (citing Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs,
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. at 49,606–07).
128. Id. at 1197–98.
129. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (2009).
130. See Blair, supra note 8, at 298–99 (noting that the FDA can make a drug manufacturer withdraw a
strengthened label if the FDA does not think it is necessary).
131. See id. at 299 (―If FDA does not allow a drug manufacturer to warn the public of potential dangers
posed by a product, yet the manufacturer still is held liable for failure to warn under a state tort claim, it
is impossible for the manufacturer to comply with both state and federal requirements. It is difficult to
ascertain how FDA‘s regulation could have been considered to do anything but preempt the field.‖);
Dinh, supra note 23, at 2102 (stating that conflict preemption can be found, regardless if Congress
appeared silent on the issue, if a state law actually conflicts with a federal law).
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company would have evidence of exactly what the Supreme Court in Wyeth
stated was lacking to find preemption—it would be impossible to comply
with both federal and state law.132
B. Submission of a Prohibition Warning and Greater Evidence of Risk
Along the same lines as unilaterally strengthening warnings of drugs
already approved, pharmaceutical companies could submit numerous
proposed warnings with a new drug application along with greater evidence
of all risks and benefits associated with the drug‘s use. The drug makers
bear the ultimate responsibility for the safety of their own products,133 but
the FDA continues to shoulder the role as the expert federal agency charged
with weighing the benefits and risks of a drug, along with proposed warning
labels, before approving the drug‘s use and warning label.134 The Wyeth
Court decision against preemption mainly relied on the fact that the FDA
did not make an affirmative decision to allow IV-push administration, did
not consider a prohibition of this use or strengthened warning, and did not
consider extensive evidence of the risks and benefits of the method.135
Therefore, a pharmaceutical company may submit extensive evidence of
a risk inherent in a drug along with several proposed warning labels, even
one amounting to a prohibition on a specific use for the drug or a delivery
method. Because the FDA is responsible for reviewing all of this
information and the proposed warning labels, the FDA will be forced to
choose an appropriate label if the FDA approves the drug. As with the
strengthened warnings for approved drugs detailed above, the drug maker
can point to the FDA‘s explicit refusal to allow a strengthened warning to
illustrate it would be impossible to comply with the FDA requirements and
state law.136
Further, if the expert agency charged with regulating drug use and
warning labels truly considers a wide possibility of proposed warnings as
well as extensive evidence of the drug‘s risks and benefits, a pharmaceutical
company may argue the decision of the FDA falls under Geier and not

132. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198 (holding that without clear evidence that the FDA would have
rejected the strengthened warning, the Court would not find preemption due to the impossibility to
comply with both federal and state law).
133. Id. at 1197–98.
134. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)–(d) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (2009).
135. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198–99.
136. See id. at 1198 (holding that without clear evidence that the FDA would have rejected the
strengthened warning, the Court would not find preemption due to the impossibility to comply with both
federal and state law); Blair, supra note 8, at 299 (stating that express rejection of a proposed warning
by the FDA should preempt a state tort claim requiring the same warning).
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Wyeth.137 The Supreme Court specifically held that Geier did not apply to
the warning label for Phenergan primarily because there was no extensive
record indicating the FDA‘s balancing of risks and benefits of heightened
warnings.138 While the Wyeth Court also recognized the federal agency‘s
rule in Geier was worthy of some level of deference because they
conducted a formal rulemaking, the holding shows the Court is more likely
to find preemption when the agency record reveals ―the factors the agency
had weighed and the balance it had struck....‖139 Therefore, even after
Wyeth, a drug manufacturer may still successfully argue that implied
preemption applies to negate a state tort claim.140 If the drug manufacturer
can point to specific evidence where the FDA did consider the risks and
benefits of a certain label and required another label, then a state tort claim
requiring more may very well frustrate the purposes and objectives of
Congress.141
The courts may soon test this argument as the Supreme Court recently
remanded a drug warning preemption case where the Third Circuit found
preemption of state tort claims.142 In Colacicco, the Third Circuit deferred
to the FDA‘s preamble asserting preemption, failed to apply a strong
presumption against preemption, and failed to recognize that drug
manufacturers maintain responsibility for drug safety through their ability
to update warnings prior to FDA approval under FDA regulations.143 These
ruling are inconsistent with the Supreme Court‘s decision and may very
well change the outcome of the case in Colacicco.144 However, such a
result is not a foregone conclusion. In Colacicco, the Third Circuit
specifically distinguished the facts and decision of the Vermont Supreme
Court in Wyeth.145 The Third Circuit based its finding of preemption
137. See Posting of Anthony J. Sebok to FindLaw.com,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20090317.html (Mar. 17, 2009) (stating that implicit preemption
because a state law frustrates the objectives and purposes of federal law may occur when the FDA has
considered the background reasons for allowing or disallowing a warning and made a decision on which
label to require).
138. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1203.
139. Id.
140. See Sebok, supra note 137 (arguing that a showing of the background reasons for a rejection may
provide a record of the balancing of risks and benefits to show a heightened warning would frustrate the
purpose of the FDA when a state may require what the FDA specifically rejected).
141. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1203–04.
142. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1578, 1578–79 (2009) (remanding case to the Third Circuit
for further consideration in light of Wyeth).
143. See Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 264–68, 275–76 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct.
1578 (2009).
144. See Colacicco, 129 S. Ct. at 1578–79.
145. See Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 271–72 n.17 (stating the Vermont Supreme Court found no evidence
that the FDA intended to prohibit defendant from strengthening the warning and therefore it was not
impossible for Wyeth to comply with both federal and state requirements but that the facts in Colacicco
are different).
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mainly on the extensive record of the drugs‘ benefits and risks considered
by the FDA, including the risk at issue in the case.146 Preemption applied,
like in Geier, because the FDA made an affirmative decision that the
science did not support a warning such as that sought by the plaintiffs in the
case.147 If the Third Circuit still makes such a finding on remand and the
Supreme Court does not hear and alter the outcome of the case,
pharmaceutical companies still have an avenue to pursue preemption
claims.148
C. Seeking Legislative Changes
Rather than seek additional preemption decisions from the courts, which
will be hard pressed to issue such findings after Wyeth, the easiest path may
very well be to seek legislative action. A clear message from Congress to
preempt state tort claims for pharmaceutical drugs in light of the Supreme
Court‘s holding will completely reverse the decision. Further, as the
current Congress may very well be disinclined to seek such an action, the
drug companies may seek legislative remedies on the state level.
Congress has seen fit to include an express preemption provision for
medical devices in the FDCA.149 The Supreme Court upheld this express
preemption provision in Reigel v. Medtronic specifically because the
medical device at issue had undergone an extensive pre-market approval
process by the FDA.150 Congress may be leery to add a similar provision
under the current circumstances of the FDA approval process and safetymonitoring regime for fear the FDA cannot adequately ensure the safety of
prescription drugs.151
Alternatively, drug companies could seek redress from individual state
legislatures to enact their own federal preemption statutes. Such statutes
could take many forms such as a statute allowing complete immunity from
state tort claims and liability when the FDA approved the drug and its
146. Id. at 271–72.
147. Id.
148. See Sebok, supra note 137 (noting that if pharmaceutical companies submit the scientific work as
in Colacicco, then Wyeth may have produced a good result).
149. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
150. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315–23 (2008).
151. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202 & n.11 (2009) (noting that ―the FDA has limited
resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market, and manufacturers have superior access to
information about their drugs, especially in the postmarketing phase as new risks emerge‖ and citing
three recent studies stating the FDA was not in a position to meet its current or emerging regulatory
responsibilities); O‘Steen & O‘Steen, supra note 2, at 85–86 (remarking that approximately half of the
FDA‘s drug evaluation budget comes from fees paid by the pharmaceutical companies in return for
expedited approval of drugs, a system that provides an incentive for the FDA to rush drugs to the market
without undertaking thorough studies to determine the risks of drugs).
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label.152 While this type of statute provides the greatest protection for
pharmaceutical companies, it allows no avenue for injured parties to seek
redress when even the Supreme Court has acknowledged the FDA cannot
guarantee drug safety.153 Prescription drug companies could seek weaker
state protections, such as those in place in Texas and New Jersey, where
compliance with FDA regulations for warning labels provides a rebuttable
presumption of the drug‘s safety.154 Finally, other states, such as Utah and
Oregon, at least attempt to limit liability by barring punitive damages for
drug manufacturers whose drugs and warnings comply with current FDA
regulations.155
V. CONCLUSION
After Wyeth v. Levine, one thing is clear: pharmaceutical companies are
responsible for the safety of their own products and potentially liable in
state courts for any injuries their products may cause.156 While drug makers
have pushed recently for a broad ruling that FDA approval of the drug‘s use
and warning labels preempts any state tort claims, the Supreme Court
resoundingly dispelled this argument.157 While many in the business
community lambasted the Supreme Court‘s decision for the effects it might
cause on the business community,158 the truth of the matter may not be as
catastrophic as initially thought. Within the ruling itself, there may still be
room for a finding of preemption if a pharmaceutical company can show
that the FDA considered and affirmatively rejected a strengthened
warning.159 In addition, an extensive record of the FDA‘s consideration of
the risks and benefits of a drug, including the specific risk associated with
an injury, may allow a finding of preemption.160 These two approaches to
limiting liability may spur pharmaceutical companies to do exactly what the
Supreme Court wanted—closely monitor their own products, continue to
inform the FDA about risks and benefits, and allow the expert federal

152. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2946(5) (2000) (stating that a drug is not defective or
unreasonably dangerous in a product liability action if the FDA approved the drug and its label for use
and the drug and label were in compliance with FDA regulations at the time the manufacturer sold the
drug).
153. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202 & n.11.
154. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.007 (Vernon 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4
(West 2000).
155. See OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-8-203 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
156. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202–04.
157. See id. at 1203–04.
158. Crovitz, supra note 123; Forbes, supra note 121.
159. See supra Part IV. B.
160. See supra Part IV.B.
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agency to make a final determination.161 Alternatively, drug manufacturers
may attempt legislative remedies to immunize themselves from liability,
such as an express preemption clause in the FDCA similar to the existing
clause for medical devices.162 As this option may not gain much traction
with the current Congress, pharmaceutical companies may instead seek
state legislation that inoculates them from liability based upon FDA
approval for their drugs.163 One thing is clear after Wyeth v. Levine,
pharmaceutical companies will have to do more work to limit their liability
from any harm their products may cause.

161. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1197–98.
162. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 152–55 and accompanying text.

